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The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees allpeople accused of a crime the right to legal counsel. In thelandmark 1963 decision Gideon v. Wainright,1 the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the right of indigent defendants
to have counsel provided. But Gideon did not end the Supreme
Court’s discussion of the circumstances in which the state is
required to provide defendants with an attorney when they
claim not to have the means to pay for one.2 Nor did it end the
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complexity of the case, resources of relatives and friends,
whether the defendant can afford to pay bail, etc.), whether or
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court utilizes a financial questionnaire or affidavit, whether the
client’s claim is investigated, and so on.5
The specific purpose of this article is to report on an evalu-
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ation of a pilot program implemented in Lancaster County
(Lincoln), Nebraska, designed to change the way in which a
defendant’s claim of indigence is assessed by the legal system.
Regardless of whether a jurisdiction uses public defenders or
another form of retaining defense counsel for indigent defen-
dants, a determination must be made regarding a defendant’s
indigency status. Given the increasing caseloads for court sys-
tems and public defender offices6 and given the interest in
ensuring that governmental procedures are optimized for effi-
ciency and fairness, specific counties or even statewide judicial
systems may choose to assess, reform, or implement new sys-
tems for determining indigence. There are a myriad of interests
in assessing indigency determination programs. For instance,
these programs have the potential to increase fairness and con-
sistency in indigency appointments, increase the efficiency of
the system, and defray costs of the justice system. Thus, the
general purpose of this article is to provide courts with evalu-
ation input into this important public function. 
LANCASTER COUNTY INDIGENT DEFENSE 
PILOT PROJECT 
Prior to the implementation of an experimental, pilot pro-
ject in Lancaster County, there were no set guidelines in
Nebraska for determining indigence.7 Judges relied on their
own philosophies and definitions of indigence, thereby creat-
ing variability in indigency appointments across judges.
Similarly, it was left to a judge’s discretion to determine
whether the defendant was eligible for a court-appointed attor-
ney. Not surprisingly, there was great variability across judges,
ranging from those who employed a rigorous line of question-
ing, to those who based their decisions on a few questions and
an assessment of the defendant’s appearance.8 As is typical in
most jurisdictions, assertions made by defendants regarding
claims of indigency were not verified by the court. From time
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to time, cases occurred in which defendants with great wealth
were subsequently found to have been given an attorney at tax-
payer expense, thereby creating a maelstrom of news coverage
and the popular perception that there are defendants “free-
loading” off the system.9
In January 2001, a three-year pilot project was initiated in
Lancaster County for the purposes of assessing three aspects of
the indigency determination system, each of which were initi-
ated at the same time.
1) A uniform rule was developed to guide defendant eligibility
for court-appointed counsel that judges were required to
follow.
2) A standardized form for documenting eligibility for
appointed counsel was introduced that judges were
required to complete.
3) A position was created and a function for the position was
determined, meaning there were would be dedicated county
court staff (“Defense Eligibility Technician” or Screener) to
obtain financial information from a defendant and verify
the information submitted by a defendant in support of a
claim of indigency. 
The program was limited to adults charged with a felony or
misdemeanor. The cost for the Screener was estimated to be
approximately $50,000 per year (changing the rule and creat-
ing a standardized form did not create annual costs). The
impacts were expected to be increased rejection of defendants’
requests for a court-appointed attorney for those not eligible
for one and an increase in court-appointed attorneys for those
eligible who might have been refused an attorney under previ-
ous practices. A preliminary evaluation of the pilot project was
conducted in 2002 by the authors.
Indigency Rule and Financial Eligibility Form10
Lancaster County’s Indigency Eligibility Rule11 contains
12. Rule I, supra note 11.
13. According to the first tier of the Rule, indigent means “[a] party
who is [r]eceiving one of the following types of public assistance:
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Emergency
Aid to Elderly, Disabled and Children (EAEDC), poverty related
veteran’s benefits, food stamps, refugee resettlement benefits,
Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or County
General Assistance Funds.” Rule I, id.
14. State v. Dean, supra note 11.
15. This provision contained in Tier 3 of Lancaster County’s Rule is
intended to operate in the same manner as Nebraska’s current
indigency eligibility statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3901(3) (Reissue
1995)
16. Rule I, supra note 12.
17. Dennis Keefe, Test of New Indigency Rules and Procedures: Three
Year Pilot Project in Lancaster County, 4 NEB. JUD. NEWS 17 (2000)
(full, unpublished report available from Lancaster County Public
Defender’s Office, 555 S 10th St, Room 202, Lincoln, Nebraska
68508).
three provisions, or “tiers.”12 Financial information relevant to
these tiers is documented on a standardized form (the
“Indigency Information Form”) and then given to the judge as
part of the defendant’s file. 
The Indigency Information Form provides information rele-
vant to deciding indigency under each tier. Under Tier 1 of the
Rule,13 if a defendant is receiving any type of federal, state, or
local poverty assistance, he or she automatically qualifies for
court-appointed counsel unless the offense will not result in
imprisonment.14 If the accused is not currently receiving any
type of federal, state, or local poverty assistance, the total
annual income and the number of dependents must be consid-
ered. A defendant is considered indigent under Tier 2 of the
Rule if he or she earns less than 125% of the federal poverty
guidelines. (Each spring, the amount of money reflected by
125% of the federal poverty guidelines is updated.) If the indi-
vidual earns more than 125% of the federal poverty guidelines,
then the judge’s discretion becomes relevant under Tier 3.
The judge is to consider sources of additional income
(interest and dividends, profits off rental property, cash earn-
ings, etc.), assets, and debts in order to determine whether the
projected cost of hiring private counsel will interfere with the
defendant’s ability to provide for the “economic necessities” of
the defendant or his or her family.15 The judge must make
“findings, including [a] comparison of the party’s anticipated
cost of counsel and available funds when applicable, on a form
. . . filed with the papers in the case.”16
In summary, under the first two tiers of the Rule, eligibility
is presumptively determined. If the defendant qualifies under
the criteria and is in jeopardy of being incarcerated if con-
victed, then the defendant is eligible for a court-appointed
attorney. If the defendant does not qualify under the first two
tiers, the judge proceeds to the Tier 3 in order to make the tra-
ditional determination of what funds are available to retain pri-
vate counsel so that the judge can balance the defendant’s
assets against the anticipated cost of counsel. It was initially
expected that more than 75% of the cases before the courts
would be determined under the first two tiers.17
Defense Eligibility Technician. 
The position of Defense Eligibility Technician/Screener was
created as a central part of the project. The Screener was des-
ignated a paraprofessional position. The Screener collects and
verifies information from defendants about their financial sta-
tus. The Screener briefly interviews defendants to collect
financial data, obtaining information about income, debts,
resources, and other financial information. The information
obtained by the Screener is recorded on the Indigency
Information Form. The information is then provided to the
judge for an indigency eligibility determination. Thereafter, the
Screener maintains a computerized record of the form and ver-
ifies the accuracy of parts of the defendant’s financial informa-
tion, reporting any discrepancies to the judge. 
ASSESSMENT AND METHODS
Research questions were determined in consultation with a
Project Oversight Committee, which included Lancaster
County judges, prosecutors, public defenders, court adminis-
trators, county commissioners, and court staff. The evaluation
was primarily based on information obtained from interviews
with key stakeholders. Information also was obtained from
basic screener program data (statistical information), an analy-
sis of screener verification efforts (truthfulness inquiry), and
courtroom observations. The evaluation design was largely a
function of the data available. Although quantitative designs
are often preferred in situations such as these for their objec-
tivity and ability to definitively show patterns, trends, and
changes overtime, the prior system left no quantitative data
available to compare. The best means to make comparisons
before and after implementation of the pilot project was to
qualitatively explore the opinions and experiences of those
involved in the system. Quantitative data available since imple-
mentation of the project were combined with stakeholders’
qualitative assessments of the project. 
Interviews
Interviews were conducted with 25 stakeholders, including
judges (county, district, and juvenile court; n=10), lawyers
(from the county and city attorneys’ offices and the office of
the public defender; n=4), screener staff, judicial administra-
tion staff, and criminal justice administration staff (n=6), and
defendants (n=5). Interviews were undertaken to obtain stake-
holder insights into how the project was operating, along with
other stakeholder information such as estimates of time spent
on indigency determinations, proportion of cases in which
erroneous information is given by defendants, and so on.
Interviews were semi-structured, thus providing consistency of
information across the respondents, while still allowing for
flexibility with each interviewee. 
Screener Program Data 
Prior to the project’s implementation, no records of requests
for court-appointed counsel were kept. Upon implementation
of the project, a database was created that recorded the infor-
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18. This suggestion is consistent with the Rule already. “If the court
finds that a party is not indigent under § 2(3)(a) the court shall
next determine whether the party is indigent under § 2(3)(b). The
court shall record its findings, including its comparison of the
party’s anticipated cost of counsel and available funds when
applicable, on a form.” (Rule I, supra note 12). However, our
review of the Forms indicates that judges do not tend to regularly
record their findings.
mation provided on the form. In order to produce a reliable
and current sample, cases for a one-year span (Fiscal Year
2001-2002) were selected for review. Screenings in over 5,000
cases (N=5,232) were examined. 
Truthfulness Inquiry 
An issue of interest is the accuracy of the information defen-
dants provide to the Screener. Since the truthfulness and accu-
racy of a defendant’s statements have no pre-established data
points, this information cannot easily be gleaned from the
Screener’s data files. Therefore, a data sample was collected
during the month of September 2002. The Screener main-
tained a record of when inaccuracies in a defendant’s report
were identified pursuant to the Screener’s verification activi-
ties. These data were collected to provide some insight into the
proportion of defendants who provide inaccurate or false
information to the courts. 
Courtroom Observations 
Research staff observed 10 arraignment sessions to deter-
mine the approximate time taken by the judge to determine
indigence (a stopwatch was used to time how long the process
took, but because a conversation might return to the question
of the defendant’s finances, we believe the assessments are
approximate, not precise), and to document the content and
extent of judges’ questioning under this process. Three of the
county court judges were observed in these sessions. During
these sessions, 115 cases were heard, and the public defender
was appointed in 33 of these cases, not appointed in two, and
refused by the defendant in three. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As previously noted, there are a myriad of interests in
assessing indigent-defense-screening programs. Programs such
as this have the potential to increase fairness and consistency
in indigency appointments, increase the efficiency of the sys-
tem, and reduce the costs of the criminal justice system by
appropriately denying those not entitled to legal aid. Of
course, it is also the case that a more fair and consistent pro-
cedure might result in a court-appointed attorney in instances
where an attorney was previously denied, thus increasing
costs. Nonetheless, it was hypothesized that oversight of eligi-
bility would decrease costs overall. 
Indigency Rule and Financial Eligibility Form
Fairness and Consistency. One way to assess the fairness of
the Indigency Rule is to determine if appropriate appointments
are made. More specifically, are defendants who are eligible
under the Rule to receive counsel appropriately receiving a
court-appointed attorney? Are eligible defendants erroneously
being denied court-appointed counsel? Are defendants who
are ineligible to receive counsel erroneously receiving a court-
appointed attorney? Are ineligible defendants appropriately
being denied a court-appointed attorney? 
As indicated previously, there were 5,232 cases screened
during FY 2001-2002 (see Table 1). The data reveal that
approximately 25% of those who receive some type of public
assistance (Tier 1 eligibility) were not appointed public
defender services. Additionally, almost 20% of those whose
income is below that of the federal poverty guidelines (Tier 2
eligibility) were not appointed public defender services. It is
not possible to know whether eligible defendants were “erro-
neously being denied court-appointed counsel” in these
instances as there are many reasons why defendants may not
be appointed counsel: no potential jail time, a plea of guilty,
or the judge believed they had the means to hire counsel. It is
not possible to know whether certain judges provide almost
100% of Tier 1 and Tier 2 defendants with a public defender
while other judges find fewer defendants eligible despite the
intent of the Rule. In any event, the rate of non-appointments
for defendants who otherwise seem eligible for a court-
appointed attorney was higher than might be expected. The
issue could be further investigated if judges regularly were to
indicate their reason on the Form for not appointing counsel
in each case.18
Overall, it seems that the majority, but not all, defendants
who were eligible under the Rule to receive counsel appropri-
ately received a court-appointed attorney. It is likely that some
defendants who were ineligible to receive counsel were erro-
neously receiving a court-appointed attorney.  Given that so
many defendants are, in fact, eligible, however, we believe the
cost of an additional $50,000 to employ a Screener to find the
comparatively few ineligible defendants is less beneficial than
the error of simply providing them with a public defender. Of
course, this depends in part on the success rate of identifying
ineligible defendants (if most ineligibles will be detected, it is
a different matter than if a small percentage of ineligibles will
be detected). In any event, fairness and consistency are
TABLE 1: DEFENDANTS PRESUMPTIVELY QUALIFYING FOR
INDIGENCY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (FY 2001-02)
Number
of Cases
Percentage
of Cases
Judge
Appointed
Atty.
Judge Did
Not Appoint
Atty.
Tier 1 1,112 21.2% 75.5% 24.5%
Tier 2 2,819 53.9% 81.3% 18.7%
Tier 3 1,301 24.9% 62.6% 37.4%
TOTAL 5,232 100.0% 75.4% 24.6%
Note: Some defendants presumptively qualified under both Tier 1 and Tier
2. The number of cases presented in Tier 2 does not include those who
previously qualified under Tier 1.
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enhanced by providing more defendants with a public
defender even if the county would not have to do so if all the
facts were verified.
Judges and other court personnel indicate their confidence
that the Indigency Rule and Form have increased the consis-
tency in determining indigence. First, judges are provided with
the same information for each defendant; therefore, defendants
have a more equal assessment of their financial situation.
Second, it provides for somewhat more consistency across
judges in that all judges are provided with the same informa-
tion. This finding of uniformity does not obviate the concern
noted previously, that is, the fact of variability across judges;
however, the impression we obtained from a variety of inter-
viewees is that most of the legal professionals in the Lancaster
Court system believe that uniformity is enhanced both by the
Rule and by the standardized information sought by the Form
than was obtained before review by the Screener. 
Efficiency. When judges were asked about time savings, sev-
eral responded that before the pilot project, determinations
(including questioning) could take anywhere between three
and five minutes. They estimated that determinations now
take under one minute (courtroom observations confirm that
determinations generally take less than 30 seconds). It appears
that the information on the Form was adequate in that judges
did not ask additional questions. In short, judges found the
financial information included on the Form to be useful,
allowing them to streamline their time and effort related to
determining indigency. 
Cost Savings. A cost savings via the introduction of the Rule
and Form would be realized if these components resulted in
more ineligible defendants appropriately being denied ser-
vices. This does not appear to be the case. On the whole, inter-
views indicate that the majority of Lancaster County judges
believe that, considering all interests at stake, it is better to err
on the side of providing a public defender than it is to deny
someone in need of a public defender. Several of the judges to
whom we spoke commented that when jail time is a possibil-
ity, even if the prosecutor might not be asking for jail time,
they are very likely to appoint an attorney. Our courtroom
observations documented this orientation: Even defendants
who refused the public defender services that judges offered
them were urged to think seriously about refusing.
We commend the practice of these judges. Court appoint-
ment of an attorney ensures the defendant will have access to
legal advice. Legal advice may help defendants to avoid unnec-
essarily pleading guilty to an offense in circumstances in which
representation may result in conviction for, or pleading guilty
to, a less serious offense, or even help secure a defendant
acquittal. In addition, court appointment helps to promote
efficient administration of justice by avoiding pro se litigation
or by ensuring that legal issues are raised and legally relevant
facts are presented. As was noted by several of the attorneys
and judges we interviewed, the criminal charge is more effi-
ciently resolved when a knowledgeable attorney is represent-
ing the defendant. However, it appears not to be simply a mat-
ter of case resolution that prompts the judges to encourage
(and appoint) public defense counsel, it is a matter of the
interest in justice that appears to inspire their behavior.
Overall, then, it seems that the rule and form do not appear to
have a significant impact on cost savings.
Defense Eligibility Technician
Fairness and Consistency. Using a defense eligibility techni-
cian to obtain a defendant’s financial information appears to
increase fairness and consistency by providing a more uniform
and accurate assessment of the defendant’s financial informa-
tion. The judges uniformly reported that they did not obtain
nearly as much financial data as the screeners provide.
Additionally, the screener can provide accurate calculations to
the judges. Defendants appear to like having the opportunity
to provide the information to a court employee who is respon-
sible for collecting this information but not for making indi-
gency determinations. They indicated they believed they were
being treated fairly. Thus it seems a screener contributes to the
efficiency of the court and the dignity and privacy of the defen-
dant by collecting financial information in a more private set-
ting than in the open courtroom, without the pressures and
anxieties of providing such information in court as part of a
public, and perhaps confusing, process. 
Efficiency. According to those involved in the process,
when the defendant’s financial information is obtained by the
Defense Eligibility Technician prior to, rather than during, a
court appearance, there is a decrease in the amount of time that
judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and other criminal jus-
tice system personnel spend on the issue of determining indi-
gence. A Screener saves judges time that they would otherwise
spend obtaining the defendant’s financial information, and it
saves attorneys time they otherwise have to spend listening to
the judge obtain the information. We spoke to six defendants
about screening issues. Defendants who had been screened in
the previous and current way commented the new pilot proce-
dure created a time savings and the overall appearance of a
more efficient courtroom. 
Cost Savings. Interviews indicate that the Screener does
provide a time savings. These savings in time could add up to
a substantial cost savings if more cases could be processed or
if judges and prosecutors were able to conduct other business
with the time they saved from having to be involved in col-
lecting or listening to financial information. However, as some
interviewees pointed out, since court officials are paid whether
they are in court or not, there are probably no measurable sav-
ings by having defendants prescreened. Although a time sav-
ings may not necessarily translate into a cost savings for the
county, there may be value in freeing up the time of court staff
(bailiffs, sheriffs, etc.) so that they can better use their time.
This savings in time is also relevant for the public, who likely
wait less time to be arraigned. On the other hand, several inter-
viewees questioned the expenditure of additional funds on a
task that could be done by a judge, who already is receiving a
salary from the public.
Verification
Fairness and Consistency. The impetus for reforming current
processes for determining indigence typically stem from the
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19. Spangenberg & Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems, supra note 4;
Spangenberg, Contracting, supra note 9; Spangenberg, Defender
Workloads; supra note 6; Stambaugh, supra note 9.
20. The Court Administrator in Oregon claims that their program,
which is a statewide—not a single court’s—effort using a central-
ized screening process, saves $2 for every $1 it spends on verifi-
cation. Personal Communications from Carol R. Flango, Director,
Knowledge and Information Services, National Center for State
Courts (October 3 and October 8, 2002). We do not know the
accuracy of Oregon’s claim.
21. SPANGENBERG GROUP, CONTAINING THE COSTS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE
occasional case in which defendants with great wealth are
found to have been given an attorney at taxpayer expense,
thereby creating a maelstrom of news coverage and the per-
ception that there are defendants “freeloading” off the sys-
tem.19 Verification may add a sense of fairness to the system by
allowing numerous court personnel, administrators, and tax-
payers to feel that defendants are not “getting away” with
access to governmental services (i.e., a public defender) to
which they are not entitled. Verification provides the sense that
some deterrence exists, reducing the likelihood that a defen-
dant will get away with giving false information to the court.
Efficiency. In its current configuration, verification efforts do
not appear to impact efficiency. In virtually no cases have there
been any additional legal actions taken in instances in which
the Screener has found that false financial information has
been provided. Even if a falsehood is detected, the majority of
judges indicated they were unwilling to stop a case to remove
the public defender once the case has started. They offered a
range of reasons. Some judges state that even if a defendant
lies, it is typically the case that the defendant does not have a
lot of resources anyway. Other judges said it would be more
expensive to the system to stop proceedings midstream and
require the defendant to find private counsel. A few judges
believe there should be prosecutions, but other judges say it
does not seem to be a good use of scarce resources to prosecute
these cases.
Cost Savings. If the screening process is successful in “weed-
ing out” those who do not qualify for counsel it would repre-
sent a cost-savings for the court system.20 In order to success-
fully identify “freeloaders,” the accuracy of financial informa-
tion being provided to the court and the Screener’s verification
efforts must be considered. 
At our request, the Screener gave us information regarding
inaccurate or false information for a one-month period. Of the
460 cases screened in the month, the Screener said she learned
that 25 individuals (5.4%) lied about financial information.
The Screener reported the month was not atypical in numbers
of defendants, kinds of cases, and so on.
There were basically three categories of inaccurate or false
information: 
When asked about their employment, four defendants
provided false information as to when they were last
employed. Three said they were unemployed recently, but
records showed that they were unemployed from two
months to two years longer than they had reported. It is
useful to note that this false information would lead a judge
to believe the defendants had more financial assets than
they actually had. The fourth defendant lied in the expected
direction, stating that he had been unemployed longer than
he really had been.
Eleven defendants reported that they were currently
employed when they were not, at least by the employer with
which they said they were employed. This falsehood could
have made these defendants ineligible for a public defender
when in reality they might have been eligible.
Ten defendants provided a fraudulent Social Security
number.
These findings indicate that in a typical month, 5% of
defendants provided inaccurate or false information to the
court. Of those providing inaccurate information, however,
only one person in 25 gave information that could have possi-
bly increased their chances of receiving public defender ser-
vices. In fact, the inaccurate information may have not even
been such that it would have made a difference in eligibility.
These findings are consistent with what several interviewees
(including the Screener and a defendant) told us: Defendants
are as likely to lie to make themselves seem more financially
secure than the facts would indicate. The reason for wanting to
seem better off financially may include such factors as wanting
to appear worthy of lesser bond, not wanting to appear desti-
tute in front of other defendants (even when financial infor-
mation is provided to the Screener, other defendants are
around to overhear the conversation, especially in the jail set-
ting), or as one judge told us, they simply do not know how
much compensation they receive from work.
The perception by some in the court system is that the pres-
ence of the Screener and the fact of verification both promote
honesty. However, conversations with defendants suggest that
they are not especially motivated to honesty, or deterred from
dishonesty, by the presence of the Screener or the existence of
a verification program. No defendant believed financial
information was verified—they did not think there would be
time to do so between the time they provided the Screener with
information and the time of their court appearance. Apparently
the prospect of future verification was not a salient concept,
nor did they indicate it was a deterrent. Similarly, judges stated
their belief that if the defendant was going to lie, the defendant
would lie to the Screener as well. The data we obtained from
the Screener support the view that either (a) not much lying
takes place, or (b) the pilot project was not much better at
catching liars than was the system in place beforehand.
CONCLUSION
Overall, the project clearly increased consistency in indi-
gency appointments by ensuring that the same financial infor-
mation was collected for each defendant and that each judge
was provided with the same information regarding each defen-
dant. Collecting financial information from defendants in a
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PROGRAMS: ELIGIBILITY SCREENING AND COST RECOVERY PROCEDURES
(National Institute of Justice 1986); Spangenberg Group, An
Assessment of the Pierce County Washington Indigency Screening and
Cost Recovery Program (Dec. 1998)(unpublished manuscript,
available from Spangenberg Group, 1001 Watertown Street, West
Newton, MA 02465); Spangenberg, Contracting, supra note 9;
David Carroll & Robert Spangenberg, Assessment of Indigent
Defense Cost Recovery in Fayette and Jefferson County, Kentucky
(October, 2001) (available at http://www.abanet.org/legalser
vices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/ky-costrecovery.pdf).
22. In Pierce County, Washington, for example, a county ordinance
was passed allowing the assessment of a $25 application fee for
those requesting indigent services. PIERCE COUNTY, WA.,
ORDINANCE 99-31 (May 25, 1999) (available at http://www.co.
pierce.wa.us/xml/abtus/plans/perf-audit/appendix%201%20-
%205.pdf); see also Public Defense Cost Recovery Task Force,
Recommendations to Implement Change in Indigent Defense
Screening and Cost Recovery (1999) (available at http://www.
co.pierce.wa.us/xml/abtus/plans/perf-audit/appendix%201%20-
%205.pdf).  
more private setting prior to the hearing also was advantageous.
Not only did it increase the efficiency of the process by reduc-
ing in-court time for judges, attorneys, and defendants, but col-
lecting financial information in a more private setting than in
the open courtroom also seemed comforting to defendants.
Data are less conclusive with regards to the extent by which
the project improved fairness in indigency appointments. The
rate of non-appointments for defendants who otherwise
seemed eligible (based on Tier I and Tier II eligibility criteria)
for a court-appointed attorney was higher than might be
expected. Interviews with judges, however, indicated that they
prefer to err on the side of providing counsel, rather than
denying someone in need of counsel. This issue could be more
fully examined if judges provided the rationale for denying
counsel on the form.
The project’s verification component in its current configu-
ration does not seem effective in uncovering financial infor-
mation that results in a denial of public defender appointments
that, but for verification, otherwise would have occurred.
Findings suggest that the percentage of defendants who are
caught providing inaccurate information about their financial
status is minimal; defendants who were caught lying were
more likely to have tried to make themselves look more finan-
cially secure than impoverished enough to have been more
readily eligible for court-appointed counsel. 
Implications for Courts Beyond Lancaster County
For jurisdictions interested in assessing, reforming, or
implementing new systems of determining indigence, the
results of this evaluation strongly support the adoption of a
uniform rule and form for determining indigence. Interviews
revealed that those involved in the court system are virtually
all positive about the uniform rule, primarily because it is
believed the Rule has resulted in greater uniformity and con-
sistency in indigency appointments. The standardized form is
considered beneficial because it helps direct the collection of
useful financial information judges need to know in order
make the decision whether to appoint counsel. 
Although screening staff appear to create a time savings for
judges and attorneys, and provide defendants with a semipri-
vate environment to provide financial information, the benefits
of their verification are less clear. On the one hand, verification
allows people to feel that defendants will not receive benefits
(court appointments) at taxpayer expense to which the defen-
dants are not entitled. On the other hand, verification does not
appear to fulfill its promise. It is our opinion that defendants
are not more honest simply because there is a court employee
who will verify financial information. It is not clear that verifi-
cation efforts succeed in uncovering financial information that
results in a denial of public defender appointments that, but
for verification, would have otherwise occurred. We do not
believe verification detects very much false or inaccurate infor-
mation. Part of the problem is it is hard to uncover the nega-
tive.  Thus, it is quite difficult for the verification process to
find that a defendant who denies employment actually has a
job or to find a savings account when the defendant does not
list one. Even when verification uncovers dishonesty, the dis-
honesty can be so minimal that it does not actually affect the
defendant’s indigency status. Finally, in most instances, it does
not seem to be good practice or policy either to stop judicial
proceedings or to prosecute defendants in those rare instances
in which inaccurate or false information is uncovered.
Alternative Verification Strategies
There are several options that would make verification
efforts more cost-effective. One possible way to address the
cost issue is to consider additional changes to the Rule that
would allow recoupment of costs incurred to provide indigent
services. Spangenberg and his colleagues are advocates of
efforts to offset costs.21 There may be some preference to
implement up-front user or application fees as opposed to
after-the-fact recoupment costs.22 With as slight a charge as
$10 application or use fee per defendant there would be
$50,000 in revenue generated, enough to virtually support the
annual cost of a Screener. For example, in FY 2001-02, there
were 5,232 cases considered for court appointment. If each
defendant were charged $10, the revenue would be over
$50,000. Or a slighter higher base fee could be established
with a sliding scale, with the goal of generating the average
amount of $10 per defendant.
Another alternative is to staff the Screener position differ-
ently. Might there be others who already have investigative
skills who could conduct the verification for the court? If pre-
trial service officers were conducting verification activities
along with their other activities, it might be possible to reduce
the costs incurred when a position is designed solely to screen
and verify financial information.
If pretrial services were to verify, who would screen? Again,
pretrial service staff could collect financial information for the
jail population. Clerk staff might be considered for undertak-
ing the responsibility of screening cases for defendants not in
jail. Again, you would have staff members who are working on
financial matters (in this case, screening) along with other
responsibilities throughout their workday. Verification respon-
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sibilities could be vested solely with pretrial service staff, and
pretrial staff could be responsible for checking the financial
data obtained by the court administrator’s staff.
Postscript
In 2005, the Lancaster County Indigency Screener Project
was cut from the county budget.  During the four years the
screening project took place there was no indication that the
program was impacting (reducing) the number of defendants
receiving court-appointed attorneys, and there was no indica-
tion of a cost savings from verification. Consequently the deci-
sion was made to terminate the project, and the money for the
project was used to fund an additional attorney in the Public
Defender’s office.  Administrators decided that for the program
to be successful, the screening needed to take place days before
the arraignment, which was not the way Lancaster County had
organized its program. 
As detailed in this article, there are clear benefits to a uni-
form rule and form for determining indigence. Jurisdictions
interested in including a screening or verification component
should consider the alternative screening/verification strate-
gies discussed in here: establishing a mechanism to recoup
costs, pairing the screening position with existing court staff,
or pairing verification efforts with existing pretrial services.
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